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Abstract 
A rationale for providing support to the farm sector in the course of economic 
development and structural change is a growing gap between the incomes of non-
agricultural workers and the incomes of farmers. Drawing on a model that enables us to 
analyze the level of social stress experienced by farmers as employment shifts from the 
farm sector to other sectors, we find that even without an increasing gap between the 
incomes of non-agricultural workers and the incomes of farmers, support to farmers 
might be needed/can be justified. This result arises because under well-specified 
conditions, when the size of the farm population decreases, those who remain in farming 
experience increasing aggregate social stress. The increase is nonlinear: it is modest when 
the outflow from the farm sector is relatively small or when it is large, and it becomes 
more significant when the outflow is moderate. This finding can inform policymakers 
who seek to alleviate the social stress of the farming population as to the timing and 
intensity of that intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
Extensive literature shows that in a great many episodes of development and transition, 
economic growth is accompanied by the transfer of production resources from the farm 
sector to the industrial and services sectors (Kuznets, 1966; Caselli and Coleman, 2001; 
Matsuyama, 2008). Starting from a seminal paper by Lewis (1954) it has long been 
recognized that agriculture importantly contributes to economic development not only by 
providing food and raw materials to the non-agricultural sectors but also, and more 
importantly, by serving as a source of unlimited supply of labor. Thanks to this, wages in 
the industrial sector remain constant and capital accumulation can be sustained. The early 
development literature indicated also that sustaining the process of investment in the 
industrial sector (especially in the closed economy), might require the savings in the 
agricultural sector to be taxed (Lewis, 1954; Johnston and Mellor, 1961). 
In line with these arguments, the governments of many developing countries have 
taxed their farmers, drawing on the proceeds to expand the industrial sector (Anderson et 
al., 2013). However, in more advanced countries this tendency seems to be reversed 
(Lindert, 1991): as these countries developed economically and agriculture shrank in 
relation to the rest of the economy, farmers have often received substantial support from 
public coffers. This phenomenon has been referred to as a “developmental paradox” 
(Barrett, 1999; Paarlberg, 2013). The experience of developing countries in the past half 
century constitutes a good example. Anderson et al. (2010) show that in the 1960s and 
1970s, governmental policies in developing countries in effect taxed the gross earnings of 
farmers, reducing them by about 20 percent on average. Since the 1980s, however, the 
anti-agricultural bias of the policies has been gradually eroded. As a result, during 2000-
2004, the revised policies served to increase the gross earnings of farmers by nine percent 
above what those earnings would have been in the absence of government intervention. 
The observed change from taxing agricultural producers to protecting them was 
particularly pronounced in the fastest growing countries in Asia, and was somewhat less 
stark in the slowest growing countries in Africa.  
Among the factors described as accounting for greater public support for farmers 
in more developed economies, special attention has been paid to structural changes that 
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are inherent to the process of economic growth. A broad consensus has emerged that 
subsidies to farmers and other means of supporting them are an appropriate response to 
an increasing gap between the incomes of workers in the non-agricultural sectors of the 
economy and the incomes of farmers (de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002; Swinnen, 2010; 
Anderson et al., 2013). The increasing gap has been observed in many historical and 
geographical contexts (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000; Cornia and Kiiski, 2001 and the 
studies cited therein). The experience of East Asian countries, including Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan, after the Pacific War, constitutes a prominent example (Anderson et al., 
1986).  
In this paper, we shed new light on the justification for public support for farmers 
when economies experience an outflow of production resources from the agricultural 
sector to the non-agricultural sectors. Our aim is not to challenge the common 
explanation that an increasing gap between non-agricultural and agricultural incomes is a 
reason for farmers being given support. Instead, we offer a complementary view. We 
argue that a fall in agricultural incomes relative to incomes in the rest of the economy is 
not necessary for farmers to experience a relative fall in prosperity, and for politicians to 
supply the farm sector with support. Using a model that enables us to quantify farmers’ 
aggregate social stress (we define this term below), we are able to infer that farmers have 
a “justifiable” case to lobby (ask) for bigger subsidies, lower taxes, and similar measures 
even when in the course of structural change the income gap between workers in industry 
and services and farmers remains unchanged. The mechanism that drives this impact is 
increased aggregate social stress that farmers experience when their fellow farmers leave 
the farming sector for work in industry and services.  
Assessment of the relationship between farm support and the size of the farming 
population is not unique to this paper. Based on the “interest group theory” pioneered by 
Olson (1965), follow-up studies argued that as the economy develops and the number of 
farmers drops, the cost of political collective action for the remaining farmers declines. 
This change increases the effectiveness of lobbying, and results in higher levels of farm 
support (Swinnen, 1994; de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002; Anderson et al., 2013 and the 
studies cited therein). Our argument is different. We maintain that the case for providing 
farm support and the incentive for farmers to lobby for financial transfers to the farm 
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sector can arise not merely because a smaller group size renders collective action easier. 
The “case” arises also because the outflow from the farm sector affects the level of 
aggregate social stress of those who remain in the sector. In pursuing this line of 
reasoning, we come close to but also differ from researchers who explained why farmers 
are able to overcome collective action problems (Nedergaard, 2006), or who identified 
the particular factors that play a part in the shaping of government policies that affect 
farmers (Salhofer et al., 2000).  
In order to assess how the outflow of production resources from the agricultural 
sector influences the farmers’ “case” for asking for subsidies, protection, and other forms 
of support, we quantify the change in the aggregate social stress of farmers as 
transformation takes its course. We show that in the course of the economy’s 
transformation, the change in social stress experienced by farmers who remain in the 
farm sector can be broken down into two components: one that is related to a change in 
the income gap between the industrial and services sectors on the one hand and the farm 
sector on the other, and another that is related to a change in the occupational structure of 
the economy, namely to a shift of employment away from farming to other sectors of the 
economy. We then show that the relationship between the number of farmers who leave 
the agricultural sector and the component of the aggregate social stress arising from the 
occupational structure of the economy has an inverted U shape: the aggregate social 
stress related to the occupational structure first increases and later decreases with the 
outflow from the agricultural sector. Importantly, this result holds irrespective of whether 
the relative income situation of the farmers deteriorates or not. Our model also indicates 
that if the number of farmers who become workers in industry and services is large 
enough, then the aggregate social stress of the remaining farmers will decrease even 
when the income gap between non-agricultural workers and farmers does not change. In 
addition, we are able to define the minimal level of support to farmers that, in the wake of 
the structural change of the economy, will keep their aggregate level of social stress 
unchanged. Should policymakers seek to alleviate the social stress of the farming 
population caused by the economy’s transformation, our finding could inform them as to 
when to interfere, and at what level of intensity of the farmers’ social stress. 
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The necessary condition for deriving our results that the aggregate social stress 
related to the occupational structure first increases and later decreases as the outflow 
from the agricultural sector progresses, is that initially the majority of the population 
works in farming. And we consider the case in which the number of farmers who switch 
from farming to non-agricultural work is not especially large. It might be reassuring to 
note that these conditions are fulfilled by the experience of a great many countries that 
have undergone structural change. The changes in the share of agricultural employment 
in total employment in the early stages of transformation in currently advanced 
economies (Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Jorgenson and Timmer, 2011; Herrendorf et al., 
2014) and in many developing countries (Timmer et al., 2014) are good examples. In the 
U.S., the share of the labor force in agriculture in 1880 was 50%. It fell to 39% in 1900, 
to 26% in 1920, and to 20% in 1940, implying an annual rate of decrease of 0.5% over 
this 60-year period (Caselli and Coleman, 2001). A similar pattern characterizes Western 
Europe (Herrendorf et al., 2014). Figure 1 shows how the share of agricultural 
employment in total employment likewise changed over time in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.   
 
Figure 1. Share of agricultural employment in total employment: Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, 1960-2010. 
Source: Timmer et al. (2014).  
Our analysis contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it relates to 
extensive writings that seek to explain the channeling of public support to the farming 
sector. (Overviews of existing studies are provided by de Gorter and Swinnen, 2002, and 
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by Anderson et al., 2013.) Although this literature has typically placed a strong emphasis 
on the fact that policies in support of the agricultural sector are importantly driven by 
structural adjustments taking place during the process of economic development, the 
specific mechanism that we present in this paper has not been studied before. Second, our 
analysis relates to writings on structural change (for a succinct literature review, see 
Matsuyama, 2008), and to studies that focus specifically on the transformation of the 
agricultural sector (Spoor, 2009; Swinnen, 2009). This literature refers to a variety of 
socio-economic changes taking place during structural changes, and seeks to explain the 
different forces that have influenced the decisions of farmers to remain in agriculture, or 
to move to other sectors. That being said, to the best of our knowledge our paper is the 
first to analyze changes in the occupational structure of the economy in conjunction with 
changes in the aggregate social stress of the farming population. We are also not aware of 
other papers that have broken down the latter aggregate into a component related to 
changes in the inter-sectoral income gap, and a component related to occupational 
migration from the farm sector to work in the non-farming sector. 
In Section 2 we introduce the measure that we will subsequently use to analyze 
the level of social stress experienced by farmers as employment shifts from the farm 
sector to other sectors. In Section 3 we present methodological considerations related to 
differentiating between relative deprivation, poverty, and inequality; to stress-related 
considerations; and to evidence linking stress with relative deprivation. In Section 4 we 
employ the measure introduced in Section 2 and find that even without an increasing gap 
between the incomes of non-agricultural workers and the incomes of farmers, support to 
farmers might be needed / can be justified. Section 5 draws on the analysis performed in 
Section 4 to inform policymakers who seek to alleviate the social stress of the farming 
population as to the timing and intensity of that intervention. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Background information on the concept of relative deprivation and on a measure 
of social stress 
2.1 A brief history of relative deprivation in economics 
Considerable economic analysis has been inspired by the sociological-psychological 
concepts of relative deprivation (RD) and reference groups. Economists have come to 
consider these concepts as fitting tools for studying comparisons that affect an 
individual’s behavior, in particular, comparisons with related individuals whose incomes 
are higher than his own income (cf. the large literature spanning from Duesenberry, 1949, 
to, for example, Clark et al., 2008). An individual has an unpleasant sense of being 
relatively deprived when he lacks a desired good and perceives that others in his 
reference group possess that good (Runciman, 1966).1 Given the income distribution of 
the individual’s reference group, the individual’s RD is the sum of the deprivation caused 
by every income unit that he lacks (Yitzhaki, 1979; Hey and Lambert, 1980; Ebert and 
Moyes, 2000; Bossert and D’Ambrosio, 2006; Stark and Hyll, 2011). 
The pioneering study in modern times that opened the flood-gates to research on 
RD and primary (reference) groups is the 1949 two-volume set of Stouffer et al. Studies 
in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier. That work documented the 
distress caused not by a given low military rank and weak prospects of promotion 
(military police) but rather by the pace of promotion of others (air force). It also 
documented the lesser dissatisfaction of black soldiers stationed in the South who 
compared themselves with black civilians in the South than the dissatisfaction of their 
counterparts stationed in the North who compared themselves with black civilians in the 
North. Stouffer’s research was followed by a large social-psychological literature. 
Economics has caught up relatively late, and only somewhat. This is rather surprising 
because eminent economists in the past understood well that people compare themselves 
to others around them, and that social comparisons are of paramount importance for 
individuals’ happiness, motivation, and actions. Even Adam Smith (1776) pointed to the 
social aspects of the necessities of life, and stressed the relative nature of poverty: “A 
                                                 
1 In Runciman’s (1966) theory of RD, an individual’s reference group is the group of individuals with 
whom the individual compares himself (cf. Singer, 1981). 
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linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and 
Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present 
times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-laborer would be ashamed to 
appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote 
that disgraceful degree of poverty […]” (p. 465). Marx’s (1849) observations that “Our 
wants and pleasures have their origin in the society; [… and] they are of a relative nature” 
(p. 33) emphasize the social nature of utility, and the impact of an individual’s relative 
position on his satisfaction. Inter alia, Marx wrote: “A house may be large or small; as 
long as the surrounding houses are equally small, it satisfies all social demands for a 
dwelling. But if a palace arises beside the little house, the house shrinks into a hut” (p. 
33). Samuelson (1973), one of the founders of modern neoclassical economics, pointed 
out that an individual’s utility does not depend only on what he consumes in absolute 
terms: “Because man is a social animal, what he regards as ‘necessary comforts of life’ 
depends on what he sees others consuming” (p. 218). 
The relative income hypothesis, formulated by Duesenberry (1949), posits an 
asymmetry in the comparisons of income which affect the individual’s behavior: the 
individual looks upward when making comparisons. Veblen’s (1899) concept of 
pecuniary emulation explains why the behavior of an individual can be influenced by 
comparisons with the incomes of those who are richer. Because income determines the 
level of consumption, higher income levels may be the focus for emulation. Thus, an 
individual’s income aspirations (to obtain the income levels of other individuals whose 
incomes are higher than his own) are shaped by the perceived consumption standards of 
the richer individuals. In that way, invidious comparisons affect behavior, that is, 
behavior which leads to “the achievement of a favourable comparison with other men 
[...]” (Veblen, 1899, p. 33).2  
 
 
                                                 
2 The empirical findings support the relative income hypothesis. Duesenberry (1949) found that 
individuals’ savings rates depend on their positions in the income distribution, and that the incomes of the 
richer people affect the behavior of the poorer ones (but not vice versa). Schor (1998) showed that, keeping 
annual and permanent income constant, individuals whose incomes are lower than the incomes of others in 
their community save significantly less than those in their community who are relatively better off.  
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2.2 The rationale and construction of a measure of social stress  
Several recent insightful studies in social psychology (for example, Callan et al., 2011; 
Smith et al., 2012) document how sensing RD impacts negatively on personal wellbeing, 
but these studies do not provide a calibrating procedure; a sign is not a magnitude. For 
the purpose of constructing a measure, a natural starting point is the work of Runciman 
(1966), who, as already noted in the preceding sub-section, argued that an individual has 
an unpleasant sense of being relatively deprived when he lacks a desired good and 
perceives that others with whom he naturally compares himself possess that good. 
Runciman (1966, p. 19) writes as follows: “The more people a man sees promoted when 
he is not promoted himself, the more people he may compare himself with in a situation 
where the comparison will make him feel deprived,” thus implying that the deprivation 
from not having, say, income y is an increasing function of the fraction of people in the 
individual’s reference group who have y. To aid intuition and for the sake of 
concreteness, we resort to income-based comparisons, namely an individual feels 
relatively deprived when others in his comparison group earn more than he does. An 
implicit assumption here is that the earnings of others are publicly known. Alternatively, 
we can think of consumption, which might be more publicly visible than income, 
although these two variables can reasonably be assumed to be strongly positively 
correlated.  
Let 
1( ,..., )my y y  be the vector of incomes in population N of size n with relative 
incidences ( )p y   1( ),..., ( )mp y p y , where m n  is the number of distinct income 
levels in y. The RD of an individual earning 
iy  is defined as the weighted sum of the 
excesses of incomes higher than 
iy  such that each excess is weighted by its relative 
incidence, namely  
                                               ( ) ( )( )
k i
N i k k i
y y
RD y p y y y

  .                                          (1) 
We expand the vector y  to include incomes with their possible respective 
repetitions, that is, we include each 
iy  as many times as its incidence dictates, and we 
assume that the incomes are ordered, that is, 
1( ,..., )ny y y  such that 1 2 ... nyy y   . In 
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this case, the relative incidence of each 
iy , ( )ip y , is 1/ n , and 
( ) ( )( )
k i
N i k k i
y y
RD y p y y y

  , defined for 1,..., 1i n  , becomes  
 
1
1
( ) .
n
N i k
k i
iRD y y y
n  
   
Looking at incomes in a large population, we can model the distribution of 
incomes as a random variable Y over the domain [0, )  with a cumulative distribution 
function F. We can then express the RD of an individual earning 
iy  as  
                                               1 ( ) |N i i i iRD y F y E Y y Y y     .                                  (2) 
To obtain this expression, starting from (1), we have that 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
[1 ( )] [1 ( )]
[1 ( )]
[1 ( )] ( | ) [1 ( )]
[1 ( )] ( | ).
i
ik i
i
k
k
k
N i k k i
y y
k k k
y y y y
k k
i i i
y y i
i i i i
i i i
i
RD y p y y y
p y y y p y
p y y
F y y F y
F y
F y E Y Y y F y y
F y E Y y Y y

 

 
 
   

    
   

 
  
The formula in (2) states that the RD of an individual whose income is 
iy  is equal to the 
product of two terms:  1 iF y , which is the fraction of those individuals in the 
population of n  individuals whose incomes are higher than 
iy , and ( | )i iE Y y Y y  , 
which is the mean excess income.  
The formula in (2) is quite revealing because it casts RD in a richer light than the 
ordinal measure of rank or, for that matter, even the ordinal measure of status, which 
have been studied intensively in sociology and beyond. The formula informs us that when 
the income of individual A is, say, 10, and that of individual B is, say, 16, the RD of 
individual A is higher than when the income of individual B is 15, even though, in both 
cases, the rank of individual A in the income hierarchy is second. The formula also 
informs us that more RD is sensed by an individual whose income is 10 when the income 
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of another is 14 (RD is 2) than when the income of each of four others is 11 (RD is 
4
5
), 
even though the excess income in both cases is 4. This property aligns nicely with 
intuition: it is more painful (more stress is experienced) when the income of half of the 
population in question is 40 percent higher, than when the income of 
4
5
 of the population 
is 10 percent higher. In addition, the formula in (2) reveals that even though RD is sensed 
by looking to the right of the income distribution, it is impacted by events taking place on 
the left of the income distribution. For example, an exit from the population of a low-
income individual increases the RD of higher-income individuals (other than the richest) 
because the weight that the latter attach to the difference between the incomes of 
individuals richer than themselves and their own income rises.  
Similar reasoning can explain the demand for positional goods (Hirsch, 1976). 
The standard explanation is that this demand arises from the unique value of positional 
goods in elevating the social status of their owners (“These goods [are] sought after 
because they compare favorably with others in their class.” Frank, 1985, p. 7). The 
distaste for relative deprivation offers another explanation: by acquiring a positional 
good, an individual shields himself from being leapfrogged by others which, if that were 
to happen, would expose him to RD. Seen this way, a positional good is a form of 
insurance against experiencing RD. 
 
3. Methodological considerations  
 
3.1 Differentiating between relative deprivation, poverty, and inequality 
An individual can be poor without being relatively poor (relatively deprived) when his 
income is low while the incomes of other individuals in his reference (comparison) group 
are not higher than his; an individual can be both poor and relatively poor (relatively 
deprived) when his income is low while the incomes of other individuals in his reference 
group are higher than his.  
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The standard measure of aggregate relative deprivation used in this paper is 
distinct from the standard measure of inequality. To see this vividly, we can look at two 
income distributions: (2, 4) and (4, 8). If inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, 
then there is no difference in this regard between the two populations; the Gini coefficient 
is the same at 1/6. However, the aggregate relative deprivation in income distribution    
(2, 4) at 1 is lower than the aggregate relative deprivation in income distribution (4, 8) at 
2.   
The dismay that arises from relative deprivation can drive a wedge between a 
transfer of income aimed at reducing poverty and a reduction of income inequality. 
Sorger and Stark (2013) and Stark et al. (2018) have shown that rich-to-poor transfer can 
induce a response in individuals’ behaviors which actually exacerbates, rather than 
reduces, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The mechanism at work 
is as follows. Consider an economy in which two individuals produce a single 
consumption good. The utility of each individual depends negatively on his work effort 
and on his (distaste for) relative deprivation (low relative income), and positively on his 
consumption. In such a constellation, a Pigou-Dalton transfer from a richer individual to 
a poorer one weakens the latter’s incentive to work hard because the income deprivation 
experienced by the poorer individual is reduced. This scaling back of effort arises 
because, fundamentally, the poorer individual seeks income for two reasons: to obtain 
income “for its own sake,” and to obtain income in order to hold at bay relative 
deprivation. When income is taken away from the richer individual, the relative 
deprivation sensed by the poorer individual is reduced, and his incentive to work to 
maintain a “bearable level” of relative deprivation is correspondingly weakened. Add to 
this the additional reduction in relative deprivation of the poorer individual by receiving 
that very income that is taken away from the richer individual. In this simple case of two 
individuals, it is obvious that the transfer reduces total relative deprivation. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the richer individual adjusts his working time (effort) so that 
he will not experience as great a reduction in income as has been taken away from him, 
but so that the adjustment falls short of neutralizing the (negative) transfer. The poorer 
individual will surely scale back his working time. In combination the two individuals 
working less than before implies that the sum of their incomes is smaller than the 
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corresponding pre-transfer value. If the reduction in total income dominates the reduction 
in total deprivation, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient will worsen. 
3.2 Complementary stress-related considerations 
In order to better understand why the measure of relative deprivation used in this paper 
represents the stress that individuals experience when they compare their income with 
other individuals in their reference group, we can refer to writings that supplement the 
ones referred to in the preceding sub-section. Scholars both in economics and in 
sociology have long maintained that individuals have a strong preference for high (social) 
rank, and are stressed when they have low (social) rank. Smith has remarked that “the 
desire of . . . obtaining rank among our equals, is, perhaps, the strongest of all our 
desires” (Smith, 1759, Part VI, Section I, Paragraph 4). Veblen (1899) has shown that 
other people’s higher pay can depress one’s utility. Maslow (1943) views status as a basic 
human need, and Huberman et al. (2004, p. 103) infer from a study of five societies that 
“subjects valued status independently of any monetary consequence.” There is 
considerable evidence from research in modern economics showing that the desire to 
escape low rank motivates workers to exert more effort (Neckermann and Frey, 2008; 
Kuhnen and Tymula, 2009; Duffy and Kornienko, 2010; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011) 
and students to perform better (Bandiera et al., 2009; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). A 
“problem” with this body of work is that, essentially, it points to an ordinal measure of 
relative deprivation, namely concern about having low rank. The measure used in this 
paper is cardinal. Thus, there are apparently two strands in the literature, which gives rise 
to two alternative ways of measuring an individual’s social stress: from occupying a low 
rank, and from experiencing an income shortfall. We have however found a way to show 
that the two perspectives are actually incorporated in the measure used in the paper. To 
see this, we express )(N iRD y  from the preceding sub-section as     
 1
1
1
(( ))
n
jn
j i
j i ii i
i
N
j
iR
y
n i n i n i
y y w y y
n in n n i n
D y
 
 
 
 
            



  
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where 
1
1 n
ji
j i
y y
n i  


  is the average income of the individuals who are positioned to the 
right of individual i in the income distribution. We can decompose this representation of 
)(N iRD y  in the following manner:   
 
1
) ( )(N i i iR n i yD y
n
y
 
    
. 
The term n i  expresses the distance in rank of individual i from the top rank, where 
“distance” is measured by the number of ranks higher up. Seen this way, the measure of 
relative deprivation used in this paper has a pure rank preferences component embedded 
in it, and a cardinal preferences component. This is revealing in the sense that the distress 
from trailing behind others can be decomposed into the distress from occupying a rank 
other than the top rank, measured by n i , and the distress arising from a positive 
magnitude of income difference between the higher incomes of others and one’s own 
income. 
A simple numerical example of the tradeoff offered by this decomposition is as 
follows: let the income distribution be {1,2,3,4,5} . The rank deprivation of the individual 
earning 3 is two, the cardinal component of his relative deprivation is 3/10, and his 
relative deprivation is 3/5. The individual can lose rank without experiencing greater 
relative deprivation. Suppose that individual 2 achieves an income increase of two units, 
which places him to the right of individual 3 in the income distribution. The ordinal 
component of the relative deprivation of individual 3 is affected, changing from two to 
three. If at the same time in which individual 2 gains two units of income, individual 5 
loses one unit of income, individual 3 remains equally relatively deprived 
at3(1/ 5)(4 3) 3 / 5  . 
Seen this way, the measure of aggregate social stress used in this paper embodies 
the joint concerns of the individuals about being low ranked and about being at a large 
distance from the incomes of higher income individuals. 
3.3 Evidence linking stress with relative deprivation  
Because in this paper we define social stress as the aggregate of the levels of stress of the 
individuals, we measure an individual’s level of stress by an index of relative deprivation, 
14 
 
and we quantify social stress by the aggregate relative deprivation, it is helpful to present 
evidence of a causal link between relative deprivation and stress.  
Tung et al. (2012) found a strong physiological link between social status and 
stress. They conducted an experiment involving 49 female macaque monkeys, divided 
initially into 10 groups. Social status was manipulated by the order in which a female was 
introduced into a social group, given the empirically established fact that earlier 
introduction confers a higher rank. Even so, seven females changed rank within their 
groups; although rank hierarchies tend to be stable, ranking sometimes changes, 
particularly with the replacement of individuals within a group. Using a procedure in 
which subordination and dominance were experimentally assigned, Tung et al. tested for 
association between social rank and gene regulation. The underlying research question 
was whether subordination (the change from higher to lower social status) triggers a 
physiological response (stress). Out of 6,097 genes considered in each female, about 16% 
were rank-associated genes. The results were quite powerful: changes in social status 
mapped onto gene expression of rank-related genes such that lower status resulted in 
greater stress and compromised immunity. In addition, the experiment by Tung et al. 
revealed that the physiological repercussions associated with social rank changed rapidly 
when social rank was revised.  
Zink et al. (2008) conducted a study of neural correlates associated with 
processing changes of social hierarchies in humans. Using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging in different experimental settings, Zink et al. found that when the hierarchical 
position of an individual decreases, brain activity is related, among other factors, to the 
processing of pain and frustration (activity in the anterior insula), and of social anxiety 
(activity in the amygdala). 
Using data on deaths by suicide in the US so as to identify the importance of 
interpersonal comparisons and “relative status,” Daly et al. (2013) found compelling 
evidence that individuals care not only about their own income but also about the income 
of others in their local area: Daly et al. showed that individual suicide risk rises with 
others’ income. This finding was obtained using two separate and independent data sets, 
suggesting that it is not an artifact of a particular sample design of either data set. The 
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finding is robust to alternative specifications and cannot be explained by geographical 
variation in suicide classification, cost of living, or access to emergency medical care. 
Specifically, treating suicide as a choice variable regarding current life satisfaction and 
assessed value of future life, Daly et al. examined the relationship between suicide risk 
and one’s own and others’ income, using data from two independent sources: the 
National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) and data from publicly available death 
certificates combined with the 5% Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 
decennial census. Holding an individual’s income constant, they found that others’ 
income, measured by local area (county) median income, was positively and significantly 
correlated with suicide risk. The relative income association holds for individuals across 
the income distribution, suggesting that suicide risk rises with median county income for 
both high-income and low-income individuals. That the finding applies also to high-
income individuals emphasizes that absolute income per se does not shield an individual 
from feeling relative deprivation. The finding is consistent with the idea that relative 
deprivation, rather than one’s own absolute income, matters for wellbeing (happiness), 
and that the stress it causes can be severe enough to make people take their own life.  
The considerations brought up in the preceding two sub-sections pave the way to 
the construction of a model that enables us to inquire how the social stress of farmers, 
quantified by aggregate relative deprivation, changes when fellow farmers leave the 
agricultural sector in the course of structural change.   
  
4. A model of change in the aggregate social stress of the farming population in the 
wake of structural change 
Let there be a population of size n, consisting of m farmers and mn   industry and 
services workers where m and n are both positive integers, 0 mn , and let m n m  . 
(As remarked in the Introduction, “initially the majority of the population works in 
farming.”) In period 0, every farmer has income 
0x , and every worker in industry and 
services has income 
0z , where 0 0 0z x  . As a measure of the social stress of a farmer 
we use the standard index of relative deprivation (RD). 
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Thus, the relative deprivation (social stress) experienced in period 0 by one of the 
m farmers is  
0 0
1
( )( )mRD n m z x
n
   . 
The aggregate social stress of the m farmers, expressed as their aggregate relative 
deprivation (ARD), that is, as the sum of their levels of relative deprivation is 
0 0
1
( )( )mARD m n m z x
n
   . 
Suppose that in period 1, the following changes take place: the income of every 
farmer grows to 
1x ; the income of every worker in industry and services grows to 1z , 
where 
1 1z x ; and k farmers, where 0 k m  , leave the farming sector to become 
industrial and services workers, obtaining there income 
1z . Then, the relative deprivation 
of one of the remaining m k  farmers is  
1 1
1
[ ( )]( )m kRD n m k z x
n
     , 
and the aggregate relative deprivation experienced by the m k  farmers is 
1 1
1
( ) [ ( )]( )m kARD m k n m k z x
n
      . 
The difference between the aggregate relative deprivation of the farmers in period 1 and 
the aggregate relative deprivation of the farmers in period 0 is 
1 1 0 0
1 1
( ) [ ( )]( ) ( )( )ARD m k n m k z x m n m z x
n n
         , 
which can be rewritten as 
                   
 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) (2 )( )
SI
ARD m n m z x z x k m n k z x
n n
ARD ARD
         
   
 (3) 
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where  1 1 0 0
1
( ) ( ) ( )IARD m n m z x z x
n
      , and 1 1
1
(2 )( )SARD k m n k z x
n
     ; 
the subscripts I and S stand for “income” and “structural,” respectively. The term 
IARD  
reflects the income gap effect: this is the change in the aggregate relative deprivation of 
the farmers that arises as a result of the change in the difference (gap) between the 
incomes of the two groups of individuals in the population, and is independent of 
occupational migration, namely it holds even if no farmer switches to become a worker in 
industry and services in period 1. Because both n and m are positive and 0n m  , the 
impact of the income gap effect on aggregate relative deprivation depends on the term in 
square-brackets in 
IARD . The sign of this term is determined by whether the gap 
between the income of a worker in industry and services and the income of a farmer 
widens or narrows between the two periods. This term can increase the aggregate relative 
deprivation of the farmers even when their incomes increase, yet the incomes of the 
workers in industry and services increase by more.  
 The term 
SARD  reflects the structural effect: this is the change in the aggregate 
relative deprivation of the farmers that arises from occupational migration - a switch by k 
farmers to become workers in industry and services. Because 
1 1z x  and because both n 
and k are positive, the sign of 
SARD  depends on the sign of its first term in parentheses. 
We note that 
SARD  can be positive even if there is no change in the incomes between 
the two periods (we note that, then, 
1 1z x  can be replaced with 0 0z x  where, as 
assumed, 
0 0z x ). In particular, 0SARD   if and only if  
 2k m n   (4) 
or, equivalently, if and only if  
 
1
2
2
k m
n n
 
  
 
. (5) 
The condition in (5) can be interpreted as follows. The structural effect 
contributes to an increase of the aggregate relative deprivation of those who stay in 
farming if and only if the share of the population that changes occupation between period 
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0 and period 1 (namely 
k
n
) is smaller than twice the difference 
1
2
m
n
 . In turn, this 
difference is the excess at the initial period 0 of the share of farmers in the population 
over one half. Thus, if the income gap effect is nil (
IARD = 0), a necessary condition for 
the aggregate relative deprivation of the farmers to increase during structural change, as 
follows from (4), is that initially the majority of the population are farmers (otherwise, 
when m n m  , the right-hand side of (4) will be smaller than 0, which contradicts the 
assumption of k being a positive integer; recall, though, that in the beginning of this 
section, it was assumed that m n m  ). From the definition of 
SARD , it also follows 
that if, in a sense made precise, the number of farmers who become workers in industry 
and services is large enough, namely if 2k m n   or, equivalently, if 
1
2
2
k m
n n

  
 
, 
then the aggregate relative deprivation of the farmers will decrease when the income gap 
does not change. Expressing 
SARD  as a function of k, we have that for values of k that 
are larger than 2m n , ( ) 0SARD k  , namely the structural component of social stress 
in period 1 is lower than the structural component of social stress in period 0. After all, 
when a good many farmers leave the farming sector, the few who are left behind do not 
experience enough combined stress that will match - let alone surpasses - the farmers’ 
initial aggregate stress. And this is so in spite of the fact that each of the few farmers who 
stay behind is much more stressed as a result of a substantial increase in the share of 
workers in industry and services.  
The relationship between the structural component of changes in aggregate 
relative deprivation, 
SARD , and k is illustrated in Figure 2, where SARD  is plotted for 
different levels of k while holding m and n constant, and while assuming that 
1
2
m
n
 . 
From (4) we know that for 0k  , the function ( )SARD k  is positive when k is smaller 
than 2m n . We also note that when  0,2k m n  , ( )SARD k  increases for k between 
0 and 
2
n
m , and decreases for k between 
2
n
m  and 2m n . The maximum of 
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( )SARD k  at 
*
2
n
k m   is obtained at a point in which the number of farmers, 
*
2 2
n n
m k m m
 
     
 
, is equal to the number of industrial and service workers. And 
the point in which ( )SARD k  subsequently crosses zero ( 2k m n  ) is the exact 
opposite of the initial shares of farmers and industrial and service workers in the 
population: when ( ) 0SARD k  , there are (2 )m k m m n n m       farmers and 
( ) ( ) (2 )n m k n m m n m        industrial and service workers. 
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of occupational migration on aggregate relative deprivation - the 
structural component. 
 
5. Policy-related implications of the model 
Drawing on the preceding considerations, we can place a precise cap on the “justified” 
support for the farm sector. To this end, we review a structural change in the economy 
such that ( ) 0SARD k   holding, for now, the incomes of farmers and the incomes of 
workers in industry and services constant between the prior-to-migration period and the 
migration period. That is, we assume a nil income gap effect on aggregate relative 
deprivation. Thus, the entire change in aggregate relative deprivation in the course of 
structural change, if it occurs, is related to the structural effect attributable to 
( )SARD k  
2m-n 0 k 
2
* n
mk 
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occupational migration. Specifically, we ask what the minimal level of the support for 
farmers during the structural change should be such that their ARD  will be retained at 
the same level as prior to the structural change. In other words, we are interested in 
calculating the subsidy s for which the incomes of farmers, 
1x , expressed as 0x s , 
yields 0ARD . 
 Assuming that the incomes of workers in industry and services and the incomes of 
farmers are held constant, the policy-related requirement of 0 ARD   is equivalent to 
the requirement  
 
 
 
1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) (2 )( )
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) (2 )( )
1 1
( )( ) (2 )( ),
m n m z x z x k m n k z x
n n
m n m z x z x k m n k z x
n n
m n m x x k m n k z x
n n
        
        
      
  
which, solving for 
1x , yields  
 * 01
0
( )
( ) (2 )
(2 )
m n m x k m n k
x
m n m k
z
m n k
 
 
 

 
. 
Given that 
1x  can be represented as 0x s , the formula for 
*
1x  allows us to calculate the 
optimal subsidy which is equal to  
* 00(2 )( )
( (2 ))
s
m n
k m n k z
m nm
x
kk 
  

 
. 
 When we relax the assumption that the incomes of workers in industry and 
services are held constant and allow these incomes to increase as the structural change 
progresses, that is, if 
1 0z z , then the requirement of 0 ARD  , namely 
                      1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1
0 ( ) ( ) ( ) (2 )( )m n m z x z x k m n k z x
n n
         ,                   (6) 
yields 
 
)2()(
))(( 00
1
**
1
knmkmnm
xzmnm
zx


 . 
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Thus, when in the course of structural change the incomes of workers in industry and 
services increase, the incomes of farmers have to be raised to 
**
1x  in order to keep their 
ARD  in check. Solving for the corresponding optimal subsidy (namely upon expressing 
1x  as 0x s ) yields  
** 0 0
1
(2 ) ( )
( ) (2 )
k m n k x m n m z
s z
m n m k m n k
   
 
   
. 
Rearranging (6), we get that 
                                       1 0 1 0 1 1
(2 )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
k m n k
x x z z z x
m n m
 
    

.                               (7) 
The representation in (7) illustrates an intuitive implication of our model: if the structural 
effect contributes to an increase in the aggregate relative deprivation of farmers (which is 
the case if and only if (4) holds, namely if and only if 2k m n  ), and when no 
subsidies are disbursed, then the increase in the incomes of farmers has to be bigger than 
the increase in the incomes of workers in industry and services for the aggregate relative 
deprivation of farmers to remain constant (recalling that 
1 1 0z x  ).  
In numerous countries, governments express concern about the welfare of the 
farming population, and quite often take a range of steps to provide financial support for 
the farming population. In order to maintain the wellbeing of the farmers in the course of 
structural change, a question to address is precisely what support to provide. The 
calculation above of **s  identifies a concrete amount and, as such, offers a policy-related 
innovation in contexts in which specific bounds are absent.  
The analysis in this paper complements related work by Stark and Zawojska 
(2016) who study policy responses to an increase in post-merger social stress. If a merger 
of groups of people is viewed as a change to their social space, then the merger alters 
people’s comparators and increases social stress: the social stress of a merged population 
is greater than the sum of the levels of social stress of the constituent populations when 
separate. Stark and Zawojska use social stress as a proxy measure for impending social 
protest. As a response to a post-merger increase in social stress, they consider a policy 
aimed at reversing the negative effect of the merger by bringing the social stress of the 
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merged population back to the sum of the pre-merger levels. Stark and Zawojska present, 
in the form of an algorithm, a cost-effective policy response which is publicly financed 
and does not reduce the incomes of the members of the merged population. Stark and 
Zawojska then compare the financial cost of implementing such a policy when the 
merger involves more groups. A surprising result reported by Stark and Zawojska is that 
the minimum sums required for keeping the post-merger level of social stress at its pre-
merger level may decrease as the number of integrating groups involved increases. In the 
current paper we ask how to tailor support, here for farmers during the structural change, 
so that their level of social stress will be contained. The analysis undertaken in the current 
paper is innovative in that it introduces a new perspective: the question addressed is not 
how to respond to a change in social stress arising from the integration of more groups 
but rather how to respond to increased social stress in a shrinking group.  
 
6. Conclusions  
The topic of agricultural protection continues to occupy a prominent place in political 
economy and development economics agendas. An observation related to this subject is 
that while countries develop economically, they gradually move from taxing to 
cushioning their farming sector. It has been argued that a rise in the inter-sectoral income 
disparity that often accompanies structural change plays the key role in this regard. We 
show that this does not need to be the case: farmers can have a “justifiable case” to lobby 
for support even when the inter-sectoral income gap remains constant. Structural change 
involves a shift of employment from farming to other sectors. Provided that the outflow 
from the agricultural sector is not too large, the aggregate social stress of those who stay 
in the farming sector can increase. And increased stress can strengthen the demand for 
relief.  
To best of our knowledge, this line of reasoning has not been alluded to 
elsewhere. In this regard, the present paper complements the received writings that have 
focused either on farmers’ support or on structural change. As already noted in Section 5, 
the implications of the model are of relevance for policymakers, should they be interested 
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in effectively alleviating the aggregate stress of the farming population in the course of 
structural change.  
Although it would be useful to supplement this paper with an empirical inquiry, at 
this stage we did not do so. The main reason for this is that the data sources currently 
available to us are not adequate for conducting such an inquiry. Verification of our model 
will require detailed data at household-level (if not at individual-level) not only about the 
farmers themselves, but also about the reference group of the farmers. In addition, the 
data will have to allow us to identify transitions from agricultural to non-agricultural 
sectors and, therefore, provide information for at least two points in time. Nonetheless, 
we are contemplating a future study in order to meet this challenge, and we have in mind 
a number of possibilities. In several countries there are political parties that have 
vehemently promoted the interests of farmers. For example, in Poland, at the beginning 
of the transformation period, farmers aligned themselves with and formed the backbone 
of the Polish Peasant Party, PSL. Although the PSL consistently campaigned in favor of 
continued support for farmers, it had different degrees of support in different agricultural 
municipalities as they experienced an uneven pace of transformation. If detailed data 
could be procured on the variation in the intensity of support for the PSL among the 
farming population as a proxy of “social anger,” together with data on “exits” from the 
farming sector in given municipalities, then it would be possible to offer a discussion of 
the empirical validity of the model’s predictions. 
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